Amin Kamel

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General

Amin Kamel Al-Qifiri
Third Vice Chairman of the Koy Socialist Revolutionary Party
Incumbent
Assumed office
10th May 2017
Serving with Ohanka Han Jon-su (first vice chairman) and Chaing Song Thaek-su (second vice chairman)
Leader Ohanka Jon Bak-su
Preceded by office established
President of the Irvadi Autonomous Socialist Republic
Incumbent
Assumed office
10th May 2017
Deputy Rasim Kamel
Preceded by Kim Chol Gul (as Chairman of T'obun-dong district)
Chairman of the National Council for Salvation
In office
5th June 1998 – 6th May 2017
Deputy Munir Hisham Saab
Preceded by Almas Karimi (as President)
General Secretary of the Irvadi Socialist Union
In office
14th February 2001 – 6th May 2017
Preceded by Almas Karimi
Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Command Council
In office
1st June 1998 – 6th May 2017
Preceded by office established
Personal details
Born 19 August 1960 (age 56)
Al-Auja, Irvadistan
Citizenship Koyro
Nationality Irvadi
Political party Koy Socialist Revolutionary Party
Other political
affiliations
Irvadi Socialist Union
Spouse(s) Jalila Nejem
Children Ali Hassan Kamel (b.1984)
Tariq Kamel(b.1987)
Hala Kamel (b.1990)
Sajida Kamel (b.1990)
Ayesha Kamel (b.1996)
Subha Kamel (b.2003)
Occupation Soldier, Statesman
Religion Shia Islam
Military service
Allegiance Irvadi flag.png Irvadistan (Until 2017)
Koyro.png Koyro (from 2017)
Service/branch Irvadi People's Army (until 2017)
Koy National Revolutionary Army (from 2017)
Years of service 1979 - present
Rank Marshal (Irvadistan)
Colonel General (Koyro)
Commands All (Supreme Commander, Irvadistan)
Irvadi Auxiliary Corps (Koyro)
Battles/wars Irvadi Uprisings (1985)
1998 Irvadi Coup
Irvadi Civil War

Amin Kamel Al-Qifiri (born 19 August 1960) is a Koy and former Irvadi politican, currently serving as the Third Vice Chairman of the ruling Koy Socialist Revolutionary Party and as the President of the Irvadi Autonomous Socialist Republic, a provincial-level administrative region established in Koyro for Irvadi refugees. He also serves on the Commission for Foreign Enlightenment and Global Liberation, as an expert for the Nautasia continent.

He was previously the de-facto leader of Irvadistan before his ousting in during the 2017 Irvadi coup d'état. He exercised political control during his 19-year reign through his Chairmanship of the National Council for Salvation, which became the supreme political power in Irvadistan following the 1998 Irvadi coup d'état, orchestrated by Kamel and his close associates.

His early successes included kickstarting a period of revival for the malignant Irvadi economy as well as the reestablishment of diplomatic ties to Koyro, previously Irvadistan's most important ally. The establishment of a Koy-trained intelligence service initially led to an overall decline in religious and ethnic violence, as well as the suppression of Islamic Collectivst movements. Thanks to the resurgent economy and Koy investment Kamel was able to reestablish agricultural subsidies and numerous social welfare programs which had been abolished by the civilian government, a move that won him widespread popular support.

Early on his regime was not without criticism. His junta received widespread condemnation from ....... for what was described as an "unlawful seizure of power from civilian authorities", overall corruption increased with Kamel personally appointing family members, as well as those of the larger Al-Qifiri tribe to prominent positions in national industries, the military and public offices to cement his own position. The state-owned oil industry became known as a particularly profitable fiefdom.

As years progressed reports of forced disappearance, public executions and the widespread use of concentration camps became more and more prevalent, with many non-governmental organisations, such as the Esquarian Human Rights Monitor and Irvadi Observatory of Human Rights vocally condemning the increasingly dire human rights situation in Irvadistan. The regime was accused of targeting the Sunni population at large with it's crackdown on religious extremist organisations.

Kamel was accused of fostering a cult of personality around himself beginning in the early 2000s.

Ultimately Kamel's government proved unable to effectively deal with religious extremist organisations, most notably the Front for Liberation and Jihad. A largely sectarian conflict errupted in 2011 which resulted in rebel organisations, predominately Sunni in religious practice, seizing control of vast swathes of the country. As the war progressed and Koy military presence became more prevalent the regime was accused of being little more than a client of Ansyu